Race is Dead by O\u27Brien, Peter
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Political Science Faculty Research Political Science Department 
Spring 1999 
Race is Dead 
Peter O'Brien 
Trinity University, pobrien@trinity.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/polysci_faculty 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Repository Citation 
O'Brien, P. (1999). Race is dead. Political Chronicle, 11(1), 34-44. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at Digital Commons @ 
Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
34 Political Chronicle 
RACE IS DEAD 
Peter O'Brien 
Implied in the work of Marx, Nietzsche and Weber is the declining signifi­
cance of race in modernity. The field of cultural studies, led by the likes of 
Edward Said, sees race as constitutive of modern (European) identity. Oddly, 
however, Said's work is inspired by both Nietzsche's and Marx's thought. I ex­
plain this curiosity by arguing that, ironically, scholarly study of racism is 
actually made possible by its waning significance. Moreover, due to this in­
creasing insignificance, students of racism must exaggerate racisms impor­
tance in order to justify their research. 
Introduction 
I intend the title to sound Nietzschesque. Like so many of Nietzsche's epigrams, this tittle seeks to provoke more than convince. I am interested in what we can learn if we, even despite evidence to the contrary, view our contemporary world as raceless at the 
core. This does not mean I suffer from some illusion that racism has disappeared. Rather, just 
as the great anti-Christ knew practiced religion was far from extinct when he proclaimed "God 
is dead," I know perfectly well that racism has hardly vanished. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
wrote: "After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave-a 
tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be 
caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown."1 Similarly, racism can be 
expected to cast its gruesome shadow for a long time despite the death of race. 
Max Weber ranked Nietzsche with Marx as the greatest interpreter of modernity. 2 Most 
of us today would not shrink from adding Weber to the celebrated list. These German 
luminaries devoted little attention to racism. And none made it a systematic part of his 
analysis of the modern experience. As I explain below, this had much to do with the fact that 
all three were racists. Yet, ironically, all three pundits' interpretations of modernity, however 
different and even opposing, imply the demise of race as a significant factor in modern life. 
Scholars who work in the field of cultural studies have sought with some success to 
revive the role race has played in modernity. They see its persistent influence and declare 
racism constitutive of modem European identity. No one has made this claim as impressively 
an d  as famously as Edward Said. In Orientalism, for example, Said writes: "It is therefore 
correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a 
racist, and imperialist, and most totally ethnocentric. "3 This remark implies, of course, that 
Marx, Nietzsche and Weber were racists, since all three had something to say about the 
Orient. 
Curiously, though, Said's work is deeply inspired by at least two of these three great 
thinkers. As will be discussed in detail below, he openly acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche 
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and even refers to his own analysis of Orientalism as a "genealogy."4 And he has stead­
fastly refused to abandon, in his scholarly and political activities, Marx's goal of the eradica­
tion of human oppression. 
Said, then, represents a most queer case: a non-racist himself who contends that race 
is constitutive of modern (European) identity but who shares much of the epistemology, 
methodology and politics of (European) racists whose work points to the ultimate insignifi­
cance of race for modernity. I hope to explain this seeming oddity by arguing that Said relies 
so heavily on racism precisely because he lives in the kind of world foreseen by Marx, 
Nietzsche and Weber, that is, one where race is increasingly insignificant. 
Race and Racism Defined 
Race does not exist independently. It is a socially constructed meaning or significance 
and therefore always dependent on context.5 Racism begets race, not vice versa. For this 
reason, race can take on many forms from one context to the next. Thus, religion can deter­
mine race (the Jews); so too can ethnicity (the Poles), skin pigmentation (the Negroes), 
mother tongue (the Hispanics) or location (the Orientals), to name a few sources of race. 
Although race has many expressions, it has some characteristics which are the same across 
the different expressions. One normally inherits one's race at birth and has no choice in 
selecting it. One is born into a specific ancestral grouping which others deem socially signifi­
cant. Race, in other words, is an ascriptive attribute. 
Racism involves a move from tangible to intangible traits. The racist identifies a person 
as a member of a specific race by an obvious characteristic (skin color, wardrobe, name, 
accent) but then attributes to the person certain attitudes or aptitudes that all members of the 
race presumably share. "Jews are thrifty." "Poles are stupid." "Hispanics are lazy." "Orien­
tals are shifty." "Blacks are horny." For the purposes of this essay, each of these remarks is 
racist, even though the source of race in each differs. 6 Racism tends to involve a belief in 
absolutes. "All Jews are thrifty all the time." The racist does not allow individual Jews a 
choice in defining themselves. Said often uses the adjective "essentialist" to characterize 
this attitude. The racist believes there exist immutable, insurmountable and, therefore, eter­
nal differences between races. Thus, Westerners, according to Said, have long held the 
conviction that people from the Orient have a certain constitutive essence (which they can 
neither alter nor shake), while those from the Occident have a different essence. Julius 
Langbehn's remark that "a Jew could no more become a German than a plum could become an 
apple" invidiously but aptly expresses the kind of essentialist racism I have in mind in this 
essay. 7 It is any and all forms of irrational essentialism-of belief in absolutes-that wane in 
the visions of modernity offered by Marx, Nietzsche and Weber. 
Marx, Niet7M:he and Weber 
For Marx, capitalism knew no bounds. Nothing could resist it. "All fixed, fast-frozen 
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, 
all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, 
all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real 
conditions of life and his relations with his kind." 8 The driving force for change is, of 
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course, profit. But the unprecedented and relentless competition of the capitalist epoch 
forces all bourgeois incessantly to innovate, to abandon the old and create the new. Al­
though originating in the economic sector or "productive relationships," the unstoppable 
drive to change spills over into other aspects of life, eventually transforming "with them all 
social conditions and relationships." Use of the word "all" had to be deliberate because it 
appears so frequently in Marx's passages concerning the impact of the bourgeois revolution 
on the world. Surely race would count among the "ancient. .. prejudices" capitalism would 
devour.9 
For Nietzsche, not capitalism, rather nihilism represented the driving force in moder­
nity. Nietzsche distinguished modernity from all other epochs because of its historicism -
the awareness of the distinction between different epochs and cultures. Historicism bred 
nihilism because historical man perforce ceases to believe in transcendental and universal 
truths and identities because he has grasped their limits. Eventually scientific historicism 
will uncover even the unconscious contradictions at the foundation of modern man's own 
identity.1 0 In Will to Power, Nietzsche writes that nihilism is ultimately ''unfaithful to its 
memories, it lets them fall, lose their leaves."1 1 The scientific study of the species and its 
history will eventually overturn all convenient memories of the kind race is. Science aims "to 
abolish all limitations of horizon and launch humankind upon an infinite and unbounded sea 
of light."12 Surely in that sea the dark irrational memory of race would drown. 
From the perspective of Weber, rationality must one day become race's assassin. In 
his vision of modernity, the advance of rational authority defined and distinguished the 
epoch. Furthermore, ''bureaucracy" represented the embodiment of rational authority. "Ev­
ery where," Weber explains, "its origin and its diffusion have .. . had 'revolutionary' 
results . .. This is the same influence which the advance of rationalism in general has had. The 
march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no rational charac­
ter. .. "13 For 
bureaucracy is "dehumaniz.ed" .. .it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, 
and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation .... The more 
complicated and specializ.ed modem culture becomes, the more its supporting external appara­
tus demands the personally detached and strictly "objective" expert, in lieu of the master of older 
social structures, who was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude.1 4 
Due to its "purely technical superiority over any other form of organization,''bureaucracy is 
destined to triumph in all walks of life. 1 5 Everything in modernity stands to be rationalized 
and bureaucratized. As is well known, Weber discerned and decried the inevitable "disen­
chantment" of the world, leaving our lives devoid of the irrational emotions, superstitions, 
and obsessions which make them worth living. Surely, racism counts among those enchant­
ments doomed to expire in the "icy polar night" of modernity. 
Three Racists 
Marx, Nietzsche and Weber were doubtless each racist. They harbored the very kind of 
prejudices against non-Europeans that their theories imply are doomed for extinction. An 
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army of cultural studies scholars, following the lead of Said, have helped us to understand 
and uncover these unconscious biases operating in each to form their own identity and their 
understanding of European civilization. Said, for instance, refers to Marx as a "non-Orientalist 
[whose) human engagements were first dissolved, then usurped by Orientalist generaliza­
tions."16 And many others have shown how Marx's category of "the Asiatic mode of 
production" was steeped in racist presumptions.1 7 Weber fares no better by Said. 
Weber's studies of Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism blew him (unwittingly perhaps) into 
the very territory originally chartered and claimed by the Orientalists. There he found encour­
agement amongst all those nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of 
ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) "mentali­
ties."1 8 
We also know that Weber was a card-carrying member of the virulently anti-Semitic and 
anti-Polish Pan-German League. Said spares his hero Nietzsche the charge of racist but did 
indirectly implicate him in the passage cited above in the introduction. But other racist 
hunters have found Nietzsche easy prey. Michel Hulin concludes that "Nietzsche was 
ultimately a victim of the lacunae in his information concerning Indological matters, and a 
prisoner of a certain stereotypical image of India carried by the culture of his time."1 9 As 
brilliant as these men doubtless were, they nevertheless depended on ultimately racist 
notions about the differences between Europeans and non-Europeans in the formulation of 
their theories. 
T he three thinkers' racism should not, however, discredit their respective theories, 
even as they pertain to race itself. To be sure, racism vis-a-vis non-Europeans permeated 
the Europe of their day so thoroughly (for just the kind of reasons Said cites), that even 
minds as sharp and seemingly independent as theirs could not avoid its sway. Marx himself 
wrote that "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of 
the living."20 Granted, the three were not only visionaries of the future but prisoners of the 
past as well. And the power of racist attitudes inherited from the past prevented each from 
fully working out the implications of their more general theories for race in particular. But 
this should not prevent others from drawing out those implications by extending the in­
sights of the three, even if doing so means exposing racist attitudes in Marx, Nietzsche and 
Weber themselves. Doing so testifies to their genius rather than against it. So strong are 
these theories of modernity that they can be stretched beyond the horizons in which their 
authors themselves lived. 
To put this line of thinking differently, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber lived in a less mature 
modernity than ours. Much like someone who sees in a child a certain trait and rightly 
judges that the trait will profoundly shape adulthood without, however, being able to 
predict the details of that adulthood, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber each saw critical qualities 
of modernity without discerning its full trajectory. Capitalism, nihilism, and rationality did, 
in fact, do little in the nineteenth century to erode the foundations of racism. But this did not 
mean that they would and could not do so as modernity matured in the twentieth century. 
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Non-Racist Said 
Said lives in a more mature modernity (some would say in postmodernity). And Said is 
an avowed non-racist. He bluntly rejects all forms of essentialism, race and other. He sees his 
work as a continuation and extension of Nietzsche's "genealogical" approach to truth claims 
which reveals their inevitable cultural, historical and political situatedness or contingency. 
"No reading is neutral or innocent, and by the same token every text and every reader is to 
some extent the product of a theoretical standpoint, however implicit or unconscious such a 
standpoint may be ... theory has to be grasped in the place and the time out of which it 
emerges as a part of that time, working in and for it, responding to it. . . "2 1 
Said's principal goal in Orientalism and its sequel Culture and Imperialism is to de­
bunk the idea of essential, permanent differences between races by revealing the contexts 
and motives behind the' representation of the differences. At the same time, he has resisted 
and rejected both "nativism" and "nationalism" as appropriate responses to Western impe­
rialism on grounds that they too suffer from essentialism. 2 2 
Despite his general rejection of transcendental truths and his particular criticisms of 
Marx's eurocentricity, Said has never been able fully to distance himself from Marx. He is 
drawn to Marx's compassion for the exploited and to his dream of universal human liberation. 
He has chastised Foucault and Derrida, who (he believes) wrongly abandon the possibility 
of human voluntarism. 2 3 He refuses to stop believing that "there is always something 
beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society, and 
this is obviously what makes change possible."24 And throughout his life, whether in his 
countless essays or his efforts as a member of the Palestine National Council, Said has 
struggled tirelessly for change in the form of national sovereignty for his Palestinian breth­
ren. 2 5 Tellingly, he closes his magnum opus with a humanistic appeal against exploitation of 
all kinds: 
No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national 
languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep 
insisting on their separation and the distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. .. It 
is more rewarding-and more difficult-to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, 
about others than only about "us." But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to 
classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how "our" culture 
or country is number one .. .. 2 6 
· One could scarcely find stronger evidence supporting Nietzsche's, Marx's and Weber's 
readings of modernity than Said's own career. Said's claim to fame - his disclosure of the 
self-interested motives behind centuries of European assertions about the Orient - is bla­
tantly ''unfaithful to the memory" of entrenched Orientalism and clearly seeks ''to abolish 
(its) limitations of horizon." If Orientalism once seemed "solid," it has certainly undergone 
considerable "melting" since Said's intervention. That unquenchable capitalist urge to 
change anything and everything to create new markets for new profits has led editors of 
books, newspapers, radio and television to see the ''value" of Said's work. Today he is as 
well known, read, heard, seen, sold, admired, interviewed as any Orientalist. Said's rise to 
Old Dominion Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University stands as 
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powerful testament to the Weberian nature of the academy. Apparently, in his promotion 
through the ranks, Said's non-Oriental colleagues had to eliminate "from official business 
love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calcu­
lation."2 7 
Said's Genealogy 
Why then does Said so fervently insist that racism is central to and constitutive of the 
modern epoch? At one point in Culture and Imperialism he goes so far as to call "the 
ontological distinction between the West and the rest of the world ... so strongly felt and 
perceived ... that we may consider these boundaries absolute."2 8 Earlier he refers to the 
distinction as "the major, I would say determining, political horizon of modern Western 
culture."29 The most obvious reply to the query is that Said focuses his research on eigh­
teenth- and nineteenth-century European literature; and there racism is indeed central. But 
this answer will not do, for Said deliberately and repeatedly stretches his argument far 
beyond the confines of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European literature. In 1981, he 
published Covering Islam, which contends that distinctions fundamentally similar and re­
lated to those prevalent in European literature continue strongly to influence the media's 
coverage of Islamic peoples and govetnments3 0 The final chapters of both Orienta/ism and 
Culture and Imperialism (allegedly the work where Said was to excise the gross exaggera­
tions of the earlier work) extend the argument about the centrality of racism to the present 
day. 
The answer must be more nuanced. In fact, it must be "genealogical." In order to 
understand the genesis, function and (I would like to think) appeal of Said's work, we need 
to situate it. We need to grasp it "in the place and time out of which it emerges a� a part of 
that time, working in it and for it, responding to it. 3 1" 
As suggested above, Said is a non-racist and has led a life in which personally race has 
mattered far less than in the time of Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber. But the non-racist willy nilly 
needs racism just as the Occidental needs the Orient. If Europe's great self-defining mission 
was world domination, Said's is the eradication of racism. But that means Said needs racists 
and a culture of racism to subdue and reform just as Kipling needed non-whites to legitimize 
his great burden. But at roughly the same time as Said's enterprise has gathered momentum, 
racism, for reasons Marx, Nietzsche and Weber signaled, has been losing steam. 
Full demonstration of this controversial assertion naturally exceeds the scope of this 
short essay. Many works exist which, to quote one prominent title, argue for the "declining 
significance of race. "3 2 Here I limit my remarks to an area dear to Said: U.S. foreign policy. 
The end of World War II marked a watershed in Western foreign policy. Not only did its 
leadership shift from European to U.S. shores, the experiences of the war profoundly mod­
ernized the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. By the end of the war, the Japanese and 
German peoples were as demonized in the West as Orientals had ever been. The representa­
tions, scholarly and popular, of these two nations presented in the West exhibited many of 
the same kinds of traits Said exposes in Orientalism. Theses of German and Japanese 
"backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West" were rampant.3 3 These repre­
sentations too were designed to glorify the West and justify its domination of the Germans 
and Japanese. 3 4 
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As victory appeared imminent, the Western Allies had to decide what to do with their 
vanquished enemies. Had they followed the racist stereotypes prevalent at the time which 
suggested that the two races were immutable, they would have laid waste to both lands; and 
this option was seriously considered (for example, in the Morgenthau Plan to "pastoralize" 
Germany). The option was, however, ultimately rejected, and the Allied leadership opted to 
rehabilitate, re-educate and integrate the two polities and peoples into the "Western commu­
nity." 
Both the decision for and the experiences with the second option amounted to pro­
found Marxian, Nietzschean and Weberian awakenings for the Allied leaders. The perma­
nent crippling of Japan and Germany, for instance, also would have meant the loss of two 
giant capitalist markets and all the potential profits that went with their revival. The profit 
motive proved able to melt the seemingly solid enmity between the warring races. Nietzsche 
once wrote that "truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they 
are."3 5 The magnificent leaps forward in the science of warfare during the first half of the 
twentieth century made it impossible to maintain the convenient illusion that inveterate 
hatred of and ceaseless revenge against one's enemy were noble qualities. The recurrence 
of a world war, the Holocaust and Hiroshima generated a nihilism ''unfaithful to the memory" 
of noble racism and nationalism. Weber entered the picture in the way of the solution. The 
modern era distinguished itself from others, he averred, in the predominance of acquired 
over ascribed traits. Perhaps the Germans and Japanese were not incurable after all. Perhaps 
they could learn new norms and values agreeable to the West. 3 6 Unprecedentedly massive 
re-education campaigns were launched in both occupied countries. The enormous success 
of these campaigns taught U.S. foreign-policy bureaucrats the benefits to be had from 
"eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emo­
tional elements. "3 7 
It would be just as silly to suggest that all traces of racism have disappeared from U.S. 
foreign policy as it would be to claim there remain no pre-capitalist characteristics in our 
economy, no religious dimensions to our secular culture, no irrational moments in our bu­
reaucracies. But as our societies have become more capitalist, secular and bureaucratic, 
more modem in a word, so too has U.S. foreign policy. The handling of Germany and Japan 
after World War II established the precedent and led to modern foreign policy strategies 
ranging from detente through Nixon's visit to China, Camp David, opposition to apartheid, 
Oslo and the expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). 
Said has lived through all of these events and has experienced the decline in impor­
tance of racism on the global as well as personal scale. In order to keep his great project alive, 
Said has had ontologically to fashion "racism" by means of distortions and representations 
not wholly dissimilar from those Europeans used to create "the Orient." For instance, Said 
criticized Orientalists for the imperialistic scope of their studies. "A classicist, a Romance 
specialist, even an Americanist focuses on a relatively modest portion of the world, not on a 
full half of it. But Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition ... we must 
learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivision 
as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism-one that is evidenced in its confusing 
amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail. "3 8 
Yet, Said himself possesses considerable historical ambition, particularly in his claim 
that there exists an uninterrupted tradition of Orientalism stretching back to Homer.39 As 
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Said ventures (way) beyond his own period, he remains prisoner to it. For it is well estab­
lished that the idea of a direct link between modem Europe and the ancient Greeks is a 
nineteenth-century invention with no basis in reality.40 Said similarly stumbles when he 
moves beyond his discipline from the study of literature to the study of U.S. foreign policy. 
In literature it makes sense to seek an underlying meaning or motivation to a text because it 
has a single author. But U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century can hardly be traced to 
one compelling motive. Nor can it be explained by the intellectual influence of five men: 
"Huntington, Pye, Verba, Lerner, Lasswell."4 1 In addition to their sweeping generalizations, 
Said's works are famous for their attention to detail where the author shows off his cel­
ebrated erudition. Though few can bring out the nuanced detail of Mansfield Park or Aida 
like Said, critics have fairly labeled his assertions that Austen's or Verdi's works are first and 
foremost about European domination of the Orient gross simplifications. 4 2 
My aim here is not to question the validity or value of Said's scholarship. Rather, I seek 
to situate his ideas in his time, just as he suggests should be done with all theories. Said 
distorts the extent of racism precisely because he has witnessed its decline in his time. By 
representing racism as virtually omnipotent, Said fashions a bigger-than-life adversary which 
in tum enhances the legitimacy and importance of his own struggle. By representing it as 
virtually omnipresent, Said has encouraged countless followers in cultural studies and other 
disciplines to join him in putting in the hard work necessary to uncover racism in its many 
guises. Said has produced and achieved much of quality and worth in his lifelong mission to 
define and shoulder the non-racist's burden. 
Conclusion 
The essay's title has two intended meanings both of which merit some explanation. 
First, race not racism is dead. I mean this in the same way as Nietzsche meant God but not 
religion was dead. By Nietzsche's time, countless people continued to believe in God but 
they no longer could hold their belief with a sense of absolute, unshakable certainty. Too 
many atheists and agnostics lived perfectly normal, even happy lives for believers not to 
entertain some doubt about their faith. Too many atheistic and agnostic practices soaked 
into the fabric of society not to undermine in part even the zealot's sense of certainty. If God 
existed and was omnipotent, why would He not smite the heathens or halt secularism? 
Nietzsche realized that when God could no longer demonstrate his omnipotence, he lost his 
constitutive quality. Similarly race has failed racists. Its alleged characteristics have not 
proven eternal and immutable as racists wish to believe. As a result, they must now hold their 
ideology with inescapable doubts. Decades ago, before the death of race, a racist who 
believed whites and blacks should not conjugate could look everywhere in his world and not 
find a single interracial couple. Today he must hold his belief with knowledge of countless 
interracial couples (often quite visible ones like Kofi Annan and his wife or Rodman and 
Madonna). Earlier a racist could maintain that a black should never hold a position of power 
over a white and look around and find no black bosses. Today they have to live with a 
nation's infatuation with Colin Powell. Racists today must repeatedly live humbling experi­
ences of the kind Jesse Owens forced on Hitler in the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. Race as a 
factor one can count on always to produce the difference(s) attributed to it by racists is dead. 
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Second, the title is intended to provoke and not necessarily convince. Nietzsche wrote 
much of his philosophy in brief averisms. This style allowed him enormous license to express 
ideas without offering a lengthy traditional demonstration. Nietzsche's method hardly pre­
dominates in the sciences today. However, there are serious methodologists who advocate 
a methodological strategy not wholly dissimilar from Nietzsche's. Before his death Imre 
Lakatos warned that premature testing of new ideas could impede progress in the sciences. 
He opposed putting newer "research programmes" to the same tests expected of older, 
established paradigms. Proponents of the older paradigm, he complained, had had much 
more time to amass supporting evidence and could therefore most often easily refute a 
fledgling competitor. He endorsed a methodological protective shell to be wrapped around a 
new paradigm's core. In the core would lie protected from refutation the paradigm's key and 
founding assumptions. Eventually, if they wish to be taken fully seriously, proponents of a 
new, challenging paradigm must venture beyond the core and pit their evidence against that 
of their competitors. However, to do so prematurely could be needlessly detrimental to the 
new paradigm and the cause of progress as well. 4 3 
In this essay I have tried to articulate the core of my idea knowing well that mountains 
of evidence exist to refute it. That core has two parts. First, scholarly focus on racism 
intensifies when racism begins to wane. It is as if we only notice it when it begins to fade. 
When it is strong and convincing, we take it for granted. This suggests that genuine racists 
cannot study racism; that one has to become a non-racist before one can study racism Gust 
as one has to become agnostic to study rather than practice religion). Second, students of 
racism, precisely because it is in decline (in their own worldview at least by the fact that they 
study it), must artificially amplify its influence in order to legitimate their research. I have 
(freely no doubt) used this rather curious constellation of Marx, Nietzsche, Weber and Said 
primarily because it was in considering these authors that the core ideas came to me. Put 
differently, I have simply shared with readers the processes of my thought which led to the 
core ideas. I hope, therefore, that the reader will approach the essay as it was intended - as 
provocation more than proof. 
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